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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
GASOLINE PRICE CONTROLS
ROBERT T. DEACON*
Since August 15, 1971, the United States petroleum products
industry has functioned under a complex and changing system of
price regulations. Prior to March 6, 1973, these controls were part of
a general system of price regulations applied to most sectors of the
U.S. economy. Since 1973, a specific program of petroleum industry
controls has evolved. The key to this system is a multi-tiered struc-
ture of controls on crude oil prices.' Regulations on subsequent
stages of production, from refining to retail distribution, tie ceiling
price increases to cost factors. The apparent intent is to force the
industry to pass along to final consumers any savings realized from
reduced crude oil prices. The question of whether or not these con-
trols have exerted any real influence on refined product prices has
been debated at length. With regard to motor gasoline, the only
major refinery product that remains controlled, the debate con-
tinues.2
Effective November 1973, petroleum refining firms faced price
ceilings set at the price charged on May 15, 1973 plus specified cost
increases incurred since that date.3 Increases in the average acquisi-
tion cost of crude oil and other petroleum product inputs were
allowed to pass directly through to ceiling prices. These "product
costs" were allocated across various refinery outputs on a simple
volumetric basis. Price limit formulae made limited allowances for
increases in such "nonproduct" cost items as labor and pollution
control, but they excluded expenses for depreciation, marketing, and
most taxes. Moreover, nonproduct costs could pass through to ceiling
*University of California, Santa Barbara. This research was supported, in part, by the
Department of Energy (formerly Federal Energy Administration), though that agency is not
responsible for the views expressed here. This paper benefited from the helpful discussions
and research assistance of Vinod Agarwal and from valuable commentary provided by
Walter J. Mead and David Mead (DOE).
1. Regarding crude oil price controls, see Erickson, et al., The Political Economy of
Crude Oil Price Controls, Nat. Res. J. (this issue).
2. As of this writing, the Department of Energy is considering exemption of motor
gasoline from price controls.
3. For a more complete description of refined product price controls, see Johnson, The
Impact of Price Controls on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy Crisis, in EN-
ERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES, (G. D. Eppen, ed., 1976) and Federal Energy Administration
Regulations, (P. W. MacAvoy, ed., 1977).
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prices only if a firm's resulting profit margin did not rise above the
level experienced in a specified prior period. Refiners who chose not
to apply all available cost increases to product prices were permitted
to accumulate "banked costs" that could be used to justify future
price increases. Although banked costs were accumulated for specific
refined products, there were limited provisions for reallocating these
costs across various refinery outputs.
Downstream from the refining activity, the structure of controls
was similar. Individual resellers and retailers were, in effect, per-
mitted to charge the price they paid for refined products plus their
May 15, 1973 markup. With respect to retail gasoline sales, a rule of
thumb was adopted which, by March 1974, permitted ceiling mark-
ups of ten cents per gallon.
During the summer of 1976 several refined products, included
residual fuel oil, middle distillates, napthas, jet fuel, and gas oils were
exempted from price controls. The only major refined product that
remains subject to ceiling price is motor gasoline.4
HAVE REFINED PRODUCT PRICE CONTROLS BEEN EFFECTIVE?
The mere presence of legal price restrictions does not, of course,
imply that actual market prices are effectively regulated. Indeed,
several analysts have concluded that competition has imposed a more
stringent discipline on petroleum product prices than has the regula-
tory apparatus.5 Perhaps the most persuasive argument supporting
this conclusion follows from the observation that, as a group, major
refining firms and large integrated petroleum companies have not
exercised all of the ceiling price increases available to them. At the
industry level, banked costs for gasoline, distillates, and other prod-
ucts were positive in every month from 1974 through February
1978, the last month for which published data are currently avail-
able.6 For motor gasoline, unexercised price increase allowances
averaged three to six cents per gallon in 1974-75, and they increased
somewhat in 1976-77. In the context of a workably competitive
industry, the conclusion that price controls are superfluous follows
naturally.
4. See, however, note 2.
5. The principal advocates of this view are C. E. PHELPS and R. T. SMITH, PETRO-
LEUM REGULATION: THE FALSE DILEMMA OF DECONTROL (1976) and J. P. KALT,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF PETROLEUM PRICES: REGULATORY WEALTH RE-
DISTRIBUTION (mimeo, UCLA Law and Economics Workship, 1977).
6. See Kalt, supra note 5, at 8, and Federal Energy Administration, Preliminary Findings
and Views Concerning the Exemption of Motor Gasoline (August 1977), and Dep't. of
Energy, Monthly Energy Review, June 1978, 62.
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The presence of refined product imports to the U.S. throughout
the price control period has also been cited as evidence of the in-
effectiveness of controls. If the U.S. is a price taker in the inter-
national market for refined products, then domestic prices (allowing
for transportation costs, trade barriers, and so forth) are effectively
set by the forces of world supply and demand. Figure 1 illustrates
this point. Domestic demand and supply schedules are shown as D
and S respectively. An elastic supply schedule for refined products
(S1), expressed in terms of delivered prices, has been horizontally
added to domestic supply to give the total supply schedule ST . In the
absence of price controls, equilibrium occurs at the price-quantity
combination P*, Q*; domestic production is QD and imports equal
Q*QD. So long as imports are observed, the equilibrium domestic
price is determined by the landed cost of foreign imports. A ceiling
price established above P* will have no effect on the market. To be
constraining, the price limit must be set below the delivered foreign
FIGURE 1
U.S. REFINED PRODUCTS MARKET
Price S
Ps (=s +s')
il
QD QW Quantity
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price in which case imports would be eliminated. To summarize,
effective price controls and foreign imports cannot coexist.
7
Historically, residual fuel oil has been the most important refined
product (in terms of volume) imported into the U.S. Since relaxation
of import quotas in 1973, motor gasoline imports have averaged only
two to three percent of domestic consumption, and most of this has
supplied cities on the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts. Small import vol-
umes do not, however, contradict the proposition that foreign sup-
plies are marginal to the U.S. market. They merely indicate that
autarkic equilibrium prices in foreign and domestic markets are too
close to support a larger volume of trade.
The lines of reasoning outlined above implicitly characterize petro-
leum product price controls as a simple ceiling price system, and
consider the U.S. refining industry as a collection of homogeneous
firms. As implemented since November 1973, however, the price
control apparatus has contained provisions which tend to produce
different ceiling prices for different firms. Prior to enactment of the
entitlements program in early 1975, access to price controlled "old
oil" differed among refining firms. Since average crude oil acquisition
cost is a primary factor used in computing allowed price increases,
such differences automatically lead to differences in ceiling prices
across firms. Even after the implementation of entitlements, which
tended to equalize crude oil acquisition costs among firms, details of
the program (e.g., the "small refiners bias," and the preferences given
to users of domestic crude oil) allowed some crude oil cost differ-
ences to remain.' Moreover, the base period used to compute
allowed price increases was May 15, 1973. This was a time of rapidly
increasing gasoline prices on world markets. Also, it roughly coin-
cided with a switch from voluntary to mandatory price controls
under Special Rule 1 of Phase III regulations, and with relaxation of
U.S. quotas on imports of crude oil and refined products. In short,
the base period was a time of dramatic change and possible dis-
equilibrium in domestic petroleum markets and it may well have
been characterized by temporary differences in prices listed by indi-
vidual firms.
7. The force of this argument depends critically upon the elasticity of foreign supplies;
see Phelps and Smith, supra note 5. Phelps and Smith extend this argument to conclude that
the crude oil subsidy implicit in the entitlements program has merely altered trade flows
without influencing domestic refined product prices.
8. A lucid discussion of the "small refiners bias" may be found in Roush, Effects of
Federal Price and Allocations Regulations on the Petroleum Industry, Federal Trade Com-
mission Staff Report (1976). The preference for domestic crude oil is analyzed in Cox and
Wright, The Effects of Crude Oil Price Controls, Entitlements, and Taxes on Refined Prod-
uct Prices and Energy Independence, LAND ECON. (February, 1978).
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For all of these reasons, refined product price controls are better
described as a system of firm specific ceiling prices.9 In such a con-
text, the banked cost argument loses much of its force, since the
presence of positive banks at the industry level simply indicates that
some firms were unconstrained. In this regard, it is noteworthy
that industry banked costs for gasoline and distillates were consis-
tently positive between November 1973 and April 1974, a period
when queues at gasoline stations and alleged shortages of other prod-
ucts were common.' 0 Further, as recently as early 1977 it was re-
ported that three major refining firms had no banked costs for motor
gasoline. 1'
In a situation where at least some firms are constrained by regula-
tion and ceiling prices vary among firms, a degree of dispersion in the
prices charged by different refined product suppliers would be ex-
pected to arise. Available evidence indicates that significant price
dispersion was associated with the implementation of specific petro-
leum industry controls. In New York and Boston, for example,
differences between daily high and low wholesale spot quotations for
regular gasoline averaged seven to nine cents per gallon in 1973-1975,
and 1.5 to three cents per gallon in 1976-77.' 2 Some of this disper-
sion, particularly in 1973-74, may have arisen from the unsettling
consequences of OPEC cartelization and the embargo. It is significant,
however, that high-low spot price differentials in Italy and Rotter-
dam averaged less than 1.5 cents per gallon in 1973-75. Prior to
1973, average differences between high and low quotations never
exceeded .25 cents per gallon in either foreign or domestic mar-
kets.' 3
The characterization of controls as firm specific price constraints
also has interesting implications for the refined products imports
argument. In the presence of domestic price dispersion, foreign sup-
plies need only be competitive with high priced domestic gasoline
9. Other sources of dispersion in individual firm's ceiling price schedules existed. See W.
J. Mead and R. Deacon, PRICE CONTROLS AND INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM
PRODUCT PRICES, Department of Energy, June 1978.
10. See Phelps and Smith, supra note 5, at 25.
11. Preliminary Findings and Views...; supra note 6, at 113.
12. The gasoline price data cited are from Platt's Oilprice Handbook (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, various years). For more detailed evidence on this phenomenon, see Mead and
Deacon, supra note 8, Ch. 3.
13. Clearly, such dispersion implies excess demand for the supplies of price constrained
firms. However, the rationing problem is not necessarily as severe as would be the case under
a simple industry wide price ceiling. If some firms are not controlled, their marginal supplies
could effectively clear the market. In other words, buyers who are unable to obtain prod-
ucts at a low controlled price could still satisfy their demands at a higher marginal price. It
should also be noted that the FEA operated a mandatory refined product allocation pro-
gram throughout this period. See Roush, supra note 7, for further details.
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produced by uncontrolled firms. The presence of imports does not
refute the proposition that price ceilings are binding for some domes-
tic producers and that the average domestic price is effectively con-
strained. A second and more damaging conclusion follows from regu-
latory provisions which allow the cost of imported crude oil and
finished products to pass through to domestic ceiling prices. Under
this policy, price controlled firms may well opt to import gasoline
and other products even at prices that exceed levels they are allowed
to charge domestic customers. Such imports offer one way for con-
strained firm to increase its price ceiling. Although the firm's average
cost would be increased by such action, dollar-for-dollar pass-
throughs for imports raise its ceiling price by the same amount; in
terms of profits, such changes are a matter of indifference. The effect
of this is to essentially eliminate any necessary relationship between
domestic and delivered foreign prices.
THE DELIVERED PRICE OF FOREIGN GASOLINE
Actual comparisons of foreign and domestic wholesale gasoline
prices can shed light on the effectiveness of gasoline price controls.
Substantial equality between domestic and imported gasoline prices,
though not conclusive (due to pass-throughs), would provide prima
facie evidence that U.S. price regulations have not been effective. On
the other hand, if import prices consistently exceed prices from
domestic suppliers, it would indicate that controls have been binding
and that observed imports are directly attributable to cost pass-
through provisions exercised by constrained firms.
Price comparisons were conducted for three foreign supply sources
and three domestic consumption points; thus a total of nine compari-
sons were examined. The three foreign export centers are Italy,
Rotterdam, and the Caribbean; during 1975-77 these three regions
accounted for 66 to 74 percent of all gasoline imports into the
U.S.1 4 During this same period, most imported gasoline entered U.S.
customs districts I, II and V-VI (combined). The three domestic
consumption points studied, i.e., Boston, New York, and New
Orleans, are major population centers in these three respective dis-
tricts.
The domestic price series employed' I are daily wholesale (ex-
refinery) quotations, recorded at mid-month, for regular gasoline.
Given the preceeding discussion of price dispersion, comparisons
14. The only major excluded supply source is Canada, which was dropped from analysis
for lack of consistent price data. See Mead and Deacon, supra note 8, Chapter 5.
15. Gasoline prices were taken from Platt's, supra note 12.
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were conducted for both "average" (simple mean of high and low
quotations) and "high" domestic prices.
The delivered foreign price for a particular origin-destination com-
bination is computed as the sum of foreign FOB price, tanker trans-
port charges (including insurance, port fees, etc.), and U.S. import
tariff. Since foreign price dispersion was relatively insignificant dur-
ing this period, the simple mean of high and low daily foreign quota-
tions (at mid-month) was used. Price quotations for European gaso-
line are described as actual transaction prices. However, the
minimum lot size for Rotterdam quotation is smaller than that
appropriate for tanker shipments and, as a consequence, Rotterdam
prices are slightly overstated (one to two cents per gallon). The only
Carribbean prices available are postings by major petroleum firms.
That posted prices may differ from true transactions prices is, of
course, well known and this caveat should not be ignored when
interpreting the results.1 6 Tanker transport charges for foreign im-
ports are consecutive voyage rates for clean cargoes shipped aboard
vessels in the 22,000 to 45,000 (Dead Weight Cargo Tons) class. The
effective import tariff on crude oil and refined products varied over
time and among individual importers. In all computations, the im-
port duty applicable to those not holding duty free licenses under
the old Mandatory Oil Import Program was used; this is appropriate
since such licenses merely confer a rent to the holder. The most
important change in import fees occurred in 1975 with the imposi-
tion of a $1.00 per barrel supplemental tariff in February which was
raised to $2.00 per barrel in June, and discontinued in December
1975.'
Price comparisons are presented in terms of the following two
hypotheses: (i) the landed foreign price of gasoline was equal to the
average domestic price, and (ii) the landed foreign price equalled the
high domestic price. The overall period studied, 1975-1977, was split
into two subperiods, 1975-76 and 1977. This was done primarily
because certain changes in price control policy (e.g., exemption of
several products, an alteration in the formula for computed banked
costs, and increased allowances for nonproduct costs) were instituted
in the last half of 1976.
Table 1 shows domestic wholesale prices and differences from
landed foreign prices. All figures are in cents per gallon and are
16. See M. A. Adelman, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET, 38. The pattern of
monthly data revealed that posted Caribbean prices followed the general trend of European
prices, but that Caribbean price changes tended to follow changes in other world markets
only after delay of several months.
17. See Mead and Deacon, supra note 8, Ch. 4 for further discussion of data sources.
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TABLE 1
FOREIGN-DOMESTIC GASOLINE PRICE COMPARISONS
(all figures in cents/gallon; t statistics in parentheses)
Boston New York New Orleans
1975-76 1977 1975-76 1977 1975-76 1977
1. Average Domestic Price: 35.99 38.83 34.48 38.43 33.13 37.13
Differences from Landed Foreign Prices:
2. Rotterdam 4.47* .19 5.96* .60 7.78* 2.26*
(8.00) (.25) (13.80) (.99) (19.10) (3.91)
3. Italy 2.51* -1.17 4.03* -. 76 5.77* .91
(4.52) (1.49) (9.02) (1.20) (13.73) (1.54)
4. Caribbean 2.05* 2.94* 3.48* 3.24* 4.77* 4.43*
(3.89) (3.95) (12.16) (8.00) (14.91) (9.80)
5. High Domestic Price: 37.90 39.84 35.65 39.09 34.89 38.04
Differences from Landed Foreign Prices:
6. Rotterdam 2.56* -. 82 4.79* -. 06 6.02* 1.27
(4.59) (1.04) (11.10) (.10) (15.34) (2.29)
7. Italy .59 -2.18* 2.86* -1.42 4.01 * -. 07
(1.09) (2.83) (6.52) (2.30) (9.96) (.13)
8. Caribbean .13 1.92 2.31* 2.57* 3.01* 3.45*
(.25) (2.52) (8.33) (6.56) (9.61) (7.79)
Sources: see text.
* significant at 1%
means of monthly data for the periods indicated. The delivered for-
eign price may be obtained by adding the reported difference to the
domestic price. Thus a positive difference indicates that the delivered
foreign price exceeds the domestic price. The statistics in parentheses
are appropriate for the null hypothesis that mean price differences
equal zero.
For the period 1975-76, all landed foreign prices significantly
exceed average domestic prices (see rows 1-4 in Table 1). Similarly,
delivered foreign prices exceeded high domestic prices in 1975-76 for
all comparisons and, with two exceptions, these differences are statis-
tically significant. Estimated price differences for this period are not
only generally significant, they are large in an absolute sense. For
average domestic price comparisons, foreign supplies were priced two
to eight cents per gallon above domestic gasoline. High price compar-
isons involving New York and New Orelans reveal a differential of
approximately two to six cents per gallon. These results are, there-
fore, inconsistent with the proposition that foreign gasoline supplies
effectively determined either the average or marginal U.S. wholesale
price of gasoline during 1975-1976.1 '
18. When comparing price differences from Italy versus Rotterdam, recall the earlier
comment on the basis for price quotations.
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The monthly price data reveal that foreign-domestic price differen-
tials were consistently observed during 1975-1976. The delivered
price of foreign gasoline (from all three sources) exceeded the aver-
age New York price in every month of this period, and exceeded the
high New York Price in all months except one. Similar monthly
patterns are evident for Boston and New Orleans. Moreover, imports
from Europe and the Caribbean were observed in almost all months
of 1975-76. The only obvious explanation for this phenomenon is
the availability of cost pass-throughs for constrained firms. Ironic-
ally, the presence of imports during this period strongly indicates the
effectiveness of price controls on gasoline.
Comparing price differences in 1975-76 to those in 1977, a
marked trend toward equality is evident. From the monthly data,
this trend began in late 1976. In 1977, landed European (non-
Caribbean) prices did not significantly exceed high domestic prices in
any of the U.S. cities examined; thus imports from Europe during
1977 can be rationalized without appeal to the pass-through argu-
ment. Moreover, European imports were significantly more expensive
than average domestic supplies only in New Orleans, and here the
difference could easily be attributed to the rather small lot sizes
upon which Rotterdam prices are quoted.' I
In contrast to European differentials, the price spread between
domestic and Caribbean gasoline did not decline in 1977 (and im-
ports from the Caribbean were observed, though at substantially
reduced volumes). In all likelihood, the lack of similarity in Euro-
pean and Caribbean price changes is due to the fact that the latter are
company postings and may well be biased. Although the degree of
bias is not known with any precision, the estimated price differen-
tials appear sufficiently small to be considered inconclusive.
On balance, observed price relationships and import activity pro-
vide strong support for the proposition that gasoline price controls
were effective, at least for some U.S. refiners, in 1975 and 1976. By
1977, however, foreign and domestic prices had reached virtual
parity. Though the evidence is not conclusive, it is consistent with
the contention that U.S. price ceilings had become ineffective by
1977.
THE SOURCES OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PRICE INCREASES
Between 1970, prior to the imposition of U.S. price controls, and
1977, wholesale gasoline prices in domestic markets rose about
twenty-five cents per gallon. This fact alone demonstrates consider-
19. Monthly price comparisons indicate that even this difference was eliminated by
mid-1977.
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able flexibility in the U.S. system of price regulation. Over the same
period, however, prices in European markets increased by thirty
cents per gallon. Although the analysis of gasoline import prices
suggests that U.S. controls were ineffective in 1977, these differences
in foreign and domestic market price increases are sufficiently large
to merit further scrutiny.
Significant differences between foreign and domestic prices natu-
rally might be attributable to influences other than U.S. price regula-
tions. Factors such as U.S. import quotas on crude oil and refined
products (prior to 1973), differences in foreign and domestic tax
policies, current U.S. controls on crude oil prices, etc. would all
affect the pattern of gasoline price increases in foreign and domestic
markets since 1970. To address the question of whether such factors
can fully account for differences in realized gasoline prices, wholesale
price increases in four major U.S. cities-Boston, New York, New
Orleans and Los Angeles-were compared to price changes in the
Netherlands.2 0 The methodology employed implicitly assumes that
refined product price differences in the two countries can be traced
to differences in marginal costs, and that marginal cost differentials
can be attributed entirely to differences in factor prices and taxes.
The first assumption is essentially one of competitive supply in both
countries. The latter assumption is accurate if both nations have
access to the same refining technology and if, at the industry level,
refining takes place at constant returns to scale. 2'
Comparisons of this sort are complicated by the joint production
nature of refining, since the marginal cost of a particular item de-
pends upon the mix of final products produced. Any change in the
20. The choice of a comparison country was largely dictated by available data and by the
requirement that the foreign price series be free of government controls. Retail petroleum
product prices are subject to government control in the Netherlands, as is the case in
virtually all industrialized nations. However, these regulations do not apply to products
produced for export. Nevertheless, retail controls may affect production decisions and thus
influence wholesale prices indirectly, and this fact should be recognized in the interpretation
of results. For further discussion, see Mead and Deacon, supra note 8, Ch. 5.
21. With constant returns to scale, the marginal cost of refined products, C, can be
expressed as function of factor prices. In the two factor case, where r, and r2 are input
prices,
C = f(r1 ,r2 ).
Changes or differentials in marginal cost are specified by taking a total differential
dC = (of/arl )dr1 + (af/ar 2 )dr 2 .
From cost minimization, it follows that
dc = (x, /q)dr, + (x 2 /q)dr2
where q is the output of refined products and x, and x 2 are levels of inputs used. Thus,
changes in factor prices are simply weighted by input-output ratios. Adjustments for specific
or ad valorem taxes on refined products are straightforward.
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mix of outputs will alter the marginal cost of each product, even if
factor prices remain constant. Refinery yields in the U.S. and the
Netherlands differ markedly; between 1970 and 1977, motor gaso-
line accounted for 43 percent to 45 percent of U.S. refinery produc-
tion as compared to 8 percent to 11 percent in the Netherlands.
Although widely different, gasoline yields in the two countries were
quite stable during the 1970's. For this reason it was assumed that
marginal cost changes induced by output mix changes were insignifi-
cant. 2 2
In summary, wholesale gasoline price changes (net of cost changes)
between a precontrol period (1970-71) and 1977 were compared for
the two countries. The specific cost factors taken into account were
crude oil prices, including tanker transport costs and import duties
where applicable, and taxes levied directly on refined products. Each
cost factor was expressed in cents per gallon for use in computing net
price changes.
The cost of crude oil to domestic refiners was directly influenced
by mandatory import quotas prior to 1973, and by crude oil prices
controls after mid-1971 since both policies created differences be-
tween U.S. and international crude oil prices. During 1970-71, the
marginal supply of petroleum to U.S. refiners was from domestic
sources, and crude oil input cost was computed as the domestic
wellhead price, plus gathering and pipelining charges, plus tanker
transport costs where relevant. In 1977, on the other hand, the price
of domestically produced petroleum, and hence its supply, was con-
trolled. For this period foreign petroleum was the marginal supply
and the landed price of foreign crude is the relevant input cost item.
Further, the entitlements feature of domestic crude oil price controls
resulted in an effective subsidy to U.S. refiners who imported petro-
leum in 1977. Throughout the 1970's, most of the crude oil refined
in the Netherlands was imported from the Persian Gulf and delivered
crude oil costs from this supply source were used to adjust foreign
prices.2 3
The foreign and domestic price series reported in Table 2 are net
of excise taxes and represent the price received by the seller. The
22. Assuming constant returns to scale, the marginal cost of a given refinery output can
be expressed as function of factor prices and percentage yields of various final products. If
yields remain constant, the formula in note 21 can be used to compute changes in the
marginal cost of a particular refined product.
23. Regarding crude oil import tariffs, the fee applicable for U.S. importers not posses-
sing duty free licenses was used. Petroleum imports to the Netherlands were not subject to
tariffs during the 1970's. All petroleum input cost estimates (for both foreign and domestic
refiners) were based upon crude oil of 340 (API) gravity and 1.7% sulfur content. A detailed
discussion of data sources may be found in Mead and Deacon, supra note 8, Ch. 4, 5.
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only other tax taken into account in adjusting prices is the value-
added tax (i.e., a noncumulative sales tax) levied in the Netherlands.
Although the rate remained constant between 1970 and 1977, it is
levied on an ad valorem basis so the actual levy depends upon the
price of the product.
Table 2 displays the results of adjusted price comparisons. All
items in this Table (except those in row 7) are expressed in U.S.
cents per gallon and are means of monthly data for the periods
indicated. The first three rows report changes in mean prices between
the precontrol period and 1977. Changes in delivered crude oil costs
(wellhead price plus transportation and tariff charges) and taxes on
refined products appear in Row 4. Although the entitlements pro-
gram is actually a part of the structure of price controls on crude oil
rather than refined products, the effect of entitlements upon U.S.
crude oil costs and refining margins is reported separately in Row 5
to highlight its influence.
From Row 6 it can be seen that increases in refining margins
TABLE 2
CHANGES IN WHOLESALE PRICES, REFINING COSTS
AND REFINING MARGINS
1970-71 a versus 1977
New New Los
York Boston Orleans Angeles Rotterdam
1. 1977 Wholesale Price 38.43 38.83 37.13 38.04 36.57
2. 1970-71a Wholesale Price 13.48 13.12 12.65 11.63 6.46
3. Price Change (1-2) 24.95 25.71 24.48 26.41 30.11
4. Total Cost Change Excluding
Entitlement 22.40 22.34 23.24 23.03 23.01
5. Entitlement Benefit 5.44 5.44 5.44 5.44
6. Margin Change Including 7.99 8.81 6.68 8.82 7.10
Entitlement (3-4+5) (.90) (.90) (.98) (1.07) (2.33)
7. t statisticsb 1.50 3.09 -. 59 2.73
Note: All figures are in cents per gallon and are means of monthly data for the periods
noted. U.S. wholesale prices are derived from averages of high and low daily quota-
tions. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
aJanuary 1970 through July 1971.
bt statistics are constructed under the null hypothesis that the mean change in a particular
U.S. refining margin is equal to that in the Netherlands. The critical level for rejection at 1
percent is 2.47.
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between precontrol and control periods were actually larger in three
of the four U.S. cities examined than in the Netherlands. Only in
New Orleans is the increase lower than that experienced in the com-
parison country, and here the difference is less than 0.5 cents per
gallon. On average, adjusted price increases in the U.S. exceeded
those in the Netherlands by slightly less than one cent per gallon.
Figures in Row 7 are t statistics constructed under the null
hypothesis that price increases (net of cost increases) in the uncon-
trolled foreign market have been identical to those experienced in
the U.S. The only items in this row that are statistically significant
involve comparisons of Boston and Los Angeles where margin in-
creases exceed those in the Netherlands. In a statistical sense, there-
fore, these results are inconsistent with the proposition that U.S.
gasoline price increases (as of 1977) have been abnormally low when
judged against an uncontrolled foreign situation. Thus, a measure of
corroboration for the analysis of refined product import prices is
Tbtained. Moreover, a comparison between cost adjusted prices in
the U.S. and the Netherlands as of 1976 indicates that foreign price
increases exceeded domestic increases by 2.0 to 2.5 cents per gallon
Detween 1970 and 1976. This is consistent with the earlier indication
From import price comparisons that U.S. controls on wholesale gaso-
line prices were binding as recently as 1976.
The overall difference between foreign and domestic price in-
-reases as of 1977 (about one cent per gallon, on average) appears to
ie within the bounds of confidence one can place upon the under-
lying data and methodology. The difference could be due to varia-
tions in environmental regulations such as U.S. restrictions on the use
af lead as an octane enhancer, to unmeasured differences in product
4uality, or to other factors. Although regulations on gasoline prices
ire apparently ineffective, price controls imposed upstream on crude
petroleum (and implemented with entitlements) are evidently hold-
ing refined product prices down. The magnitude of the effect on the
wholesale price of gasoline is shown in Row 5 of Table 2. If crude oil
-ontrols and the entitlements program are phased out as planned, the
-ost of marginal barrels of crude oil to U.S. refiners will increase, and
:orresponding refined product price increases, perhaps mitigated by
)roduct imports, can be expected. It is possible that offsetting gains
fhrough reduced government involvement and complying company
idministration costs will also occur.
CONCLUSIONS
The central conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that
,ompetition, not regulation, is enforcing the current structure of gaso-
October 19781
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
line prices in the U.S. Thus it is difficult to see why controls should
continue; they appear to do little more than to impose an adminis-
trative burden on government and industry. It is possible that a few
petroleum product suppliers remain effectively constrained. How-
ever, in the context of a firm specific price control system, decontrol
of such firms need not result in unamibiguous product price in-
creases. Prices charged by constrained firms would presumably rise
with decontrol, and this would be reflected in increases in low mar-
ket price quotations. But these price increases would induce greater
supplies from previously constrained firms, placing downward pres-
sure on unconstrained prices. Spreads between high and low price
quotations would be reduced, but average prices could either rise or
fall.2 4
Although the ineffectiveness of current price regulations is a suffi-
cient basis to argue for decontrol, it is not necessarily the only basis
upon which the argument can be made. The inefficiencies in produc-
tion and exchange induced by general price ceilings are familiar. Price
increases for refined products are merely symptomatic of a more
fundamental change-in this case, reduced world supplies of crude
petroleum. It makes little difference whether this scarcity stems
primarily from international political events or from purely physical oi
market phenomena. Suppressing the symptoms of the change hinders
market responses that would alleviate its effect. In addition, the U.S.
system of refined product price controls contains its own peculiari-
ties that are difficult to rationalize. For example, firms that are able
to demonstrate high production costs are rewarded with ceiling price
increases, and refiners who limit production are granted preferential
treatment.2 S Moreover, the general attempt to reduce gasoline price,
paid by final consumers coexists with regulations to improve gasoline
mileage in new automobiles and thereby reduce consumption.
The present system of gasoline price controls reflects an attempi
to redistribute the windfall gains accompanying world crude oil pricE
increases from domestic oil producers to consumers of final prod.
ucts. The complexity of this multi-tiered regulatory structure attest;
to the difficulty of the task. If nothing else, the U.S. experimeni
with petroleum product price controls has demonstrated the ineffi.
ciency of the gasoline pump as a tool for redistribution.
24. Of course, the current situation may change; a reduction in the entitlement subsidy
or a rise in foreign oil prices could set off future gasoline price increases. However, given the
cost pass through allowances in the present control policy, refined product price increases
would result regardless of whether or not price controls axe in effect.
25. Preferences exist in the "small refiners bias" feature of the entitlements program and
in an attractive pass through formula available to those refiners who limit production to
within 10% of 1973 levels. See Mead and Deacon, supra note 8, Ch. 1.
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